The use of incentive contracting in aircraft procurement. by Redden, Edward G.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1965
The use of incentive contracting in aircraft procurement.
Redden, Edward G.

















Lieutenant, United States Navy
Submitted in partial fulfillment of










THE USE OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTING
IN AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
Edward G. Redden
This work is accepted as fulfilling





United States Naval Postgraduate School

ABSTRACT
The largest program in the Navy budget is procurement and one of the
largest appropriations within this program is aircraft procurement . Because
it does represent such a substantial portion of the budget, aircraft procure-
ment is potentially one of the most important areas for improving cost
effectiveness in the Navy. One important available instrument for increas-
ing this cost effectiveness, by increasing efficiency in aircraft procurement,
is the incentive type contract. The value of the incentive type contract
lies in its ability to compensate for the lack of economic market condi-
tions associated with aircraft procurement.
The Navy's use of incentive contracts since 1951 and the resultant
opinions and actions of the Navy, government legislative agencies, and the
aircraft industry are presented. These actions and opinions are discussed
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The procurement program is the largest single program in the Navy's
annual budget and one of the largest appropriations within this program is
aircraft procurement. In fiscal year 1965 Congress appropriated (all figures
in millions)$2,496.4 for Navy aircraft (and missile) procurement out of a
total procurement program of $5,467.9 or 45.67«. Missile procurement amounts
to approximately 23% of the appropriation which reduces the available funds
to approximately $1,922.3 for aircraft and related equipment alone. As an
example of total military aircraft procurement, in fiscal year 1959 air-
craft procurement amounted to (in millions) $6,487 or 30.57» of the total
military procurement program. These huge financial transactions, so vital
to the nation's defense, are carried on under very unique market conditions
that require the utmost in co-operation between the government and the air-
craft industry.
The Navy participates in aircraft procurement in the role of a monop-
sonist for together with the Air Force they comprise close to 907o of the
aircraft industry's market. Associated with this monopsonist position is a
great degree of price control. The Navy's objectives are to obtain the most
effective aircraft to meet defense requirements within given budget restraints
which implies a requirement for efficient production and avoiding the pay-
ment of excessive profits. The Navy must also participate in the general
military spending objective of maintaining a sound civilian econom y and in
this particular case an economically sound aircraft industry.
The aircraft industry is the nation's biggest employer and several
Study of Aircraft Procurement - Contract Types and Contracting Methods ,




member firms have replaced such concerns as General Motors, Ford and Bethlehem
Steel as the leading government prime contractors. Due to its dynamic nature
and the extreme complexity of its product the aircraft industry acts much
like a monopolist with the associated degree of price control in its deal-
ings with the government. It is an industry of a great many risks and un-
certainties due to (1) rapid technological change which often necessitates
government cancellation, acceleration or modification of contracts, (2) sales
instability, (3) long lead time from the design to the sale of an aircraft
with the associated probability of product demand shift and input price
variation, (4) keen competition for government business with non-govern-
ment opportunities extremely limited and (5) diversification limitations due
2
to the high degree of personnel and facilities specialization required.
The operating and production practices of the aircraft industry are influenc-
ed by these risks and uncertainties as is the outlook of commercial financial
institutions which often necessitates government financial backing of air-
craft development. The aircraft industry is also being greatly influenced
at the present time by the growth of the missile and space business with
the resultant incentive to intensify efforts in these areas at the possible
expense of manned aircraft development and production efforts.
Once an aircraft contract has been secured and production commenced,
the experience and investment of the contractor cannot be shifted to another
contractor without undesirable costs to the government. This fact coupled
with the small number of aircraft producers capable of meeting many of the
government's aircraft requirements greatly contributes to the monopolistic
character of the industry. The difficulties in conducting aircraft procurement
2
J. Fred Weston, Procurement and Profit Renegotiation , San Francisco:
Wadworth Publishing Company Inc., 1960, p. 123.
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transactions beneficial to both the Navy and industry under this monopsonist-
monopolist relationship, with the resultant lack of economic market condi-
tions, can be greatly alleviated through the use of effective contractual
incentives.
The actual contracting in an aircraft procurement transpires after an
extensive amount of preliminary ground work during which time many incentives
act upon the aircraft industry to provide a top quality product when it is
needed but without a proportionate cost controlling incentive. Procurement
procedures for an aircraft begin when the military requirements for that air-
craft is determined by the Chief of Naval Operations. The necessary funds
for the aircraft are provided and controlled by Congress, the Bureau of the
Budget and the Department of Defense and Navy Comptrollers. This budget-
ing step acts as an incentive to the aircraft industry since they know the
amount of funds appropriated for the project and that if the most effective
aircraft isn't provided to meet requirements within the given financial re-
straints the available funds can be cancelled or shifted to an alternative
weapon system. This incentive is substantially reduced under government high
priority procurements. After funds have been approved the aircraft design
competition is initiated amongst the various firms through the issuance of
a request for proposals by the BuWeps Contracting Division with the obvious
incentive of gaining contract award. Awards can be made for developing
competing types of aircraft with performance competition determining the
aircraft to be retained for service use as happened to be the case with the
3
F-105 and the F-4H, although unintentionally. Awards can also be made to
more than one company for procurement of partial quantities as was the case
3






with the B-47 (Boeing, Douglas and Lockheed) and F-84 (Republic and General
Motors) during the Korean conflict. These award methods can be effective
incentives for industry to provide the government with timely receipt of a
highly effective aircraft but the costs for such peacetime developments and
production would be prohibitive.
After design evaluation, contractor selection is made by cognizant
Department of Defense, Secretary of the Navy and Bureau of Naval Weapons
Personnel. Use of a contractor performance evaluation system and investi-
gation of contractors' past profit rates by selection personnel acts as the
incentive at this step of the procurement process. Following design evalua-
tion and contractor selection a definitive procurement request [37] is issued
by the aircraft sponsoring activity in the Bureau of Naval Weapons to the
BuWeps contracting division. Upon receipt of the procurement request the
contracting division begins negotiations with the selected aircraft firm to
establish contract type, provisions and price. Although formal advertising
is the recommended method for all government procurement, the finances and
technical specialization required to produce the complex aircraft of today
make negotiation the only feasible method of procurement. The Armed Services
Procurement Regulation (3214.2) lists exceptions to formal advertising which
allow the use of the negotiation method in aircraft procurement.
The incentives mentioned as acting thus far in the procurement process
are but a sampling of those that continually spur the firms in the aircraft
industry to provide the highest quality product on time. Due to the constant
and demanding nature of these incentives the use of contractual incentives
at the contracting stage of the procurement provides perhaps the greatest op-
portunity for improving cost effectiveness in aircraft procurement. It is

at this contract and price setting stage that the aircraft supplier begins
to assume his monopolistic character but it is also at this stage that Navy
contracting personnel can establish mutually satisfactory cost and profit
figures, while further extending the quality and time incentives in effect
up to this stage, through the effective use of the incentive type contract.
The incentive type contracts, which were developed by the Navy during
World War II and which are presently authorized for use by A S P R 3-404
and 3-405, are the fixed price incentive contract (FPI) and the cost plus
incentive fee contract (CPIF) . The purpose of the incentive type contract
is to aid in assuring that (1) the government receives the most effective
aircraft to meet its requirements, (2) contract schedules are met or bene-
ficially surpassed, (3) costs are kept to a minimum while providing an equi-
table profit for the contractor under the prevailing circumstances, or (4)
a product completed under a weighted combination of the three previous fac-
tors. The incentive type contract should be established to induce the con-
tractor to assume as much of the risk associated with meeting the incentive
goals as is possible.
Practically all incentives are established on a negotiated sharing
basis. For cost incentives, a cost sharing formula would be negotiated at
70/30 (for example) whereby the government would be responsible for 70 cents
of every dollar of actual cost in excess of the negotiated target cost with-
in the operative cost range while the contractor would be responsible for the
remaining 30 cents. Conversely, for cost underruns the contractor would
receive a 30 cent increase in profit for every dollar saved under target
cost within the operative cost range while the government would realize a
70 cent saving on each dollar of underrun. For performance incentives,
targets would be negotiated in such areas as speed, operating altitudes and

maneuverability. Predetermined rates of profit increases would be made for
percentage increases in performance goals while failure to attain goals
would result in profit reduction on a percentage basis. Delivery incentives
are established much in the same manner as performance incentive arrange-
ments with the substitution of target delivery or completion dates for per-
formance targets. Whenever performance or schedule incentives are used it
is imperative that a cost controlling incentive also be applied, for obvious
reasons.
When the fixed price incentive contract is to be used the Navy and the
contractor negotiate (1) a target cost with which to compare the final
negotiated cost for profit determination, (2) an equitable target profit
related to the target cost, (3) a maximum price for which the government
will be responsible and (4) a sharing formula, before contract award is
made. Under the FPI contract the contractor has no profit ceiling but with
a ceiling price in effect he must provide the government with a product meet-
ing specifications regardless of the cost to him. The cost sharing formula
in effect becomes 0/100 when the ceiling price is reached. Because of this
feature, the FPI contract is preferred to the CPIF contract. (See appendix
A for a sample FPI multiple incentive contract arrangement)
.
When the cost plus incentive fee contract is to be used the Navy and
the contractor negotiate (1) a target cost with which to compare the final
audited allowable costs [25] for profit determination (2) a target fee,
(3) a sharing formula and (4) maximum and minimum fees. A continued share
line may be used for cost overruns vice a minimum fee which would create a
cost sharing arrangement beyond any considered minimum fee point. Because
the CPIF contract is used under conditions of greater development and/or

production risks than the FPI contract the minimum fee is included to pro-
tect the contractor against excessive unforseeable risks while the maximum
fee protects the government from paying excessive, windfall profits. How-
ever, the incentive contract should be aimed more at increasing cost ef-
fectiveness rather than protecting against contingencies. The degree of
confidence in setting incentive targets determines the choice between FPI
and CPIF contracts. (See Appendix B for a sample CPIF nraltiple incentive
contract arrangement).
The incentive type contracts have their greatest applicability in the
field of aircraft procurement due to the risks associated with the industry
and the complexity of the product required by the government. The wide
range of performance capabilities required for most Navy aircraft, with
given budget restraints, makes the use of incentive contracts most attrac-
tive. If used effectively they can provide the necessary tradeoff between
risk protection and objective realization resulting in more co-operative
and rewarding Navy -industry relations.
The cost plus incentive fee contract finds applicability in the stages
of aircraft development and initial production. Generally during these
stages the lack of cost and production experience does not allow for deter-
mination of incentive targets accurately enough to permit use of a fixed
price type contract. The cost plus fixed fee is the alternative type for
the CPIF. In the CPFF contract the desire for Ubllow on production acts as
an incentive for quality and timely work but there is no incentive to keep
costs to a minimum as there is in the CPIF. The CPFF provides the opportun-
ity for contractors to submit know^low cost estimates to gain contract award
with assurance of a particular fee and the opportunity for increasing profits
on later production. With the use of CPIF the cost estimates are likely to

be more realistic since the contractor shares in any cost overruns and his
fee is reduced proportionately. The CPIF provides for rewards commensu-
rate with quality of work performed while the CPFF awards a predetermined fee
regardless of the quality of performance. Except in the early stages of air-
craft research when the work is of a broad general nature, the CPIF contract
should be used in lieu of the CPFF for the advantage of both the Navy and the
contractor.
The fixed price incentive contract is most applicable for follow on
and long run production where enough cost and production experience is avail-
able to permit reasonably accurate cost and incentive targets. The alter-
native for this type contract is the firm fixed price contract. The FFP
contract obviously acts as a greater cost incentive than the FPI contract
but since profit equals fixed price minus costs there are distinct advant-
ages to controlling costs at the expense of quality and schedule. Since the
contractor's profits are reduced in direct proportion to cost increases his
willingness to assume risks to improve product quality is greatly reduced.
Under this type contract the Navy does not share in production experience
as it would in the FPI. The Navy's often used authority to order changes to
aircraft in production also makes the FFP contract unfeasible since the costs
of the Navy's belated decisions can be borne extensively by the contractor.
If incentives aren't provided to encourage and enhance necessary changes,
technological advancements can make an aircraft obsolete before it becomes
operational. Since target costs are usually determinable to about the same
degree of accuracy in the FPI and FFP contracts, when cost underruns exist
the contract price will be less under the FPI type since the underrun is
shared by the government. Thus windfall profits can be greater under the
FFP type. Except for the long run production of aircraft such as trainers
8

or utility types, where design and performance specifications and production
processes can be assured of no further changes, the FPI contract should be
used in lieu of the FFP type.
It may be argued that the incentive type contracts result in increased
administrative costs but any administrative costs must be considered insigni-
ficant in comparison to the cost savings and quality advantages that can be
gained through the use of the incentive type contract. The flexibility of
the incentive type contracts to adapt to the many contingencies arising
throughout the aircraft procurement process can make them the most useful
and advantageous contract types for both the Navy and the contractor, if
used properly.
Despite the many advantages offered to both the Navy and industry in
the incentive type contracts they have failed to gain full acceptance due
to the many difficult problems that must be overcome to insure their success-
ful incorporation and administration. Use of the incentive contracts re-
quire more extensive planning by both parties and requires the utmost in
teamwork between government procurement and technical personnel. Highly
qualified government negotiators are a necessity and the problems to be
overcome for effective use of the incentive contracts often requires over-
working of these qualified personnel to the extent that their effective-
ness is limited.
Another major problem to be met is the determination of contract costs.
A great deal of the success that may result in a procurement hinges on this
factor. The contractor must determine costs as accurately as possible using
all available information and cost reductions that become known to the
contractor prior to the completion of negotiations must be passed on to the
government. All pertinent subcontracting costs must also be accurately

determined and included. It is the responsibility of the Navy contracting
personnel to accurately evaluate these cost figures, for it is on the basis
of these figures that target profits and profit ranges are negotiated. Not
only must contract costs be determined but any cost savings that may befall
the contractor as a result of the increased government business must also be
weighted. Costs are probably the most important of the incentives and they
are the most difficult to determine and evaluate since they are continually
subject to the influence of changing factor prices and changing technology.
Factors to be considered when establishing target costs are listed in ASPR
3-808.
Contracting personnel must provide the contractor with the firmest
possible specifications in order to minimize the number of unknown contin-
gencies facing the contractor. The difficulties in meeting this necessity
are apparent from the broad military requirements established and the complex-
ity of the aircraft so often needed to meet these requirements. Aircraft
design must be frozen as soon as possible, for design or specification changes
will often require changes to the established incentive formulas. Changes
can act as a negative incentive and even necessitate acceptance of a less
desirable type of contract. This was examplified when the Navy contracted
for the F9F-8T. Although over 600 F9F-8's had been produced prior to the
F9F-8T, the number of required changes made the use of a cost type contract
4
necessary.
Establishment of performance incentives is also a problem to be consid-
ered. The range of incentive effectiveness must cover the performance
characteristics only to the extent that they are useful to the Navy's needs
and thus eliminate unnecessary goldplating.
4
Booz-Allen-Hamilton, 0p_. Cit . , p. 120.
10

The Setting of schedule incentives also poses a formidable problem, for
the Navy contracting personnel must have a knowledge of the contractors pro-
duction capabilities and must be able to predict the optimum time for fleet
introduction of the aircraft in order to make the incentive effective. Like
the cost incentive, the effectiveness of a schedule incentive is dependent
on the establishment of firm aircraft specifications and the minimization
of design changes.
In the establishment of any and all of the incentive targets there is
the difficulty of properly weighting the incentives so that any one or combina-
tion cannot be exploited at the expense of another. Careful balancing of
the various criteria must be made so that any necessary tradeoffs amongst in-
centives will provide the Navy with the most effective aircraft for the avail-
able dollar. The setting and balancing of incentives must be made as soon as
possible in the procurement process for the later that targets are established
the greater is the probability that they will be too firm to act as incentives.
Probably the biggest problem to be faced, on which the successful solu-
tion of most other problems is hinged, is an intangible one. It is the pro-
blem of establishing confident, cooperative relations between the Navy con-
tractors and the aircraft industry. The incentive type contracts cannot





Navy aircraft procurement has been characterized by extensive initial
use of the letter type contract (necessitated by inaccurate cost data, long
lead time requirements forcing rapid initiation of the procurement and/or
a lack of firm aircraft specifications) with later conversion to the fixed
price incentive contract. Approximately 90% of all Navy aircraft procure-
ments since 1951 have been initiated through the letter type contract. Be-
tween 1951 and 1957 out of 142 Navy aircraft production contracts 84 were
converted from letter type to fixed price incentive, 3 were initiated through
fixed price incentive contracts, 16 were fixed price initiated or fixed price
converted from letter type, 15 were cost type and the remaining 24 were
still unconverted from the letter type. Exhibit I lists several major
Navy aircraft procurements since 1951 that utilized the fixed price incen-
tive contract and the cost results of those contracts. Several significant
factors are pointed out in this exhibit. Out of the 22 contracts cited,
19 resulted in cost underruns but whether these underruns were primarily due
to inaccurate target costing or contractor efficiency is indeterminable.
The lowest final profit rates are associated with the cost overrun contracts
and there is generally an extensive time lag between the letter contract
date and the date of conversion to a definitive type contract.
Frederick T. Moore of the RAND Corporation has compiled data on cost
behavior in incentive type contracts from a sampling of the 148 Navy and Air
Booz-Allen-Hamilton, 0p_. Cit . , p 98A.
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Force procurement contracts with several different companies and also of
80 separate incentive type contracts with North American Aviation. The
results of Moore's analysis compare favorably with the results illustrated
in exhibit I. In the sample of 148 contracts there were cost overruns in
777„ of the cases and in the sample of 80 contracts there were underruns 727.
of the time with the large underruns (greater than 107.) generally occuring
in the smaller size contracts. Moore also analyzed 250 cost contracts and
found cost overruns in 557. of that sample.
With so many apparent successes it would appear that the Navy has develop-
ed and is using the incentive contracts to their full potential but more re-
cent aircraft procurements indicate that there are many opportunities for more
frequent advantageous application of the seldom used cost plus incentive fee
contract. One such case was the F8U procurement. In this procurement the
Navy received an effective aircraft when it was needed despite the necessitated
contract arrangements. Letter contract No- as 54-605 was entered into for 5
test aircraft providing for delivery of 2 of these aircraft within 10 months.
At the time for conversion of this contract to a definitive type, 34 months
after the letter contract, only 2 of the experimental aircraft had been del-
ivered and there was so little cost experience that a cost type contract had
to* be used. No aircraft other than the test models had been produced or
flown by October 1954 when negotiations got underway for the 1955 program
g
so another letter contract (NO-as 55-170) had to be issued. A properly ap-
plied CPIF contract could have helped alleviate this situation as it may also
have done in the A3D procurement.
Frederick T. Moore, Military Procurement and Contracting; An Economic
Approach
.
(Santa Monica; RAND Corp., 1962), p. 47-49.
Q
Booz-Allen-Hamilton, 0p_. Cit . , p. 109.
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The A3D-1 (letter contract NO-as 52-981) and A3D-2 (letter contract N0-
as 54-249) were converted to fixed price incentive contracts in late 1954.
However, in the fall of 1956, due to the inability of the Navy and Douglas
Aircraft to agree on cost data, the follow-on contract (NO-as 55-190) for
9
the A3D -2 was merged with 2 prior contracts and converted to CPFF.
Large and partially avoidable costs overruns in the CPFF contract used during
the procurement of the XP6M, XF8U-1 and A4D-1 provide a convincing argument
for avoiding its use whenever possible.
Another example of where use of the cost type contract should have been
avoided was in the procurement of the F9F-8T. As cited earlier in this paper,
the number of changes required for developing the F9F-8T from the F9F-8 pre-
cluded the use of a FPI contract despite the facts that the manufacturer con-
sidered the F9F-8T to be approximately 90% in common with the F9F-8 and that
the F9F-8 (contract No-as 53-1138) had underrun a target cost of $16.9 million
by $1.6 million.
Further evidence perhaps of the need for more effective contracting was
the fact that as of April 30, 1961 the Navy had a backlog of 1,141 undeliver-
ed aircraft on order amounting to approximately $1.8 billion.
An early but nevertheless recent use of the CPIF contract was in the A?F
procurement. The contract for this aircraft was awarded to the Grumman Air-
craft Engineering Corp., in January 1958 for $101, 701, 000, Cost, aircraft
performance and equipment performance were the incentives applied and a 4 to
15% incentive range was set on the targets. The apparent success of this








Katherine Jphnsen, "USAF, Navy Criticized on Aircraft Buys", viation
Week and Space Techno logy
,
(June 19, 1961), p. 30.
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faced by the Navy in training and retaining the skilled personnel required
to maintain this complex weapons platform.
The value of the CPIF and FPI contracts is quite evident in past Navy
aircraft procurements and their effective use will be even more important
under the relatively new weapon system approach to aircraft procurement where
greater cost controls and government monitoring of contractors, vice close
inspection, is required. The weapon system concept of procurement refers to
the placing of maximum responsibility on one single management organization
for the design and specifications of the weapon system and for integrating
the various components into a fully operational system.
One of the most important influences on the Navy's use of incentive type
contracts is the attitude of Congress and the resulting Congressional pressures.
Amongst the members of Congress directly concerned with Department of Defense
procurement activities the predominant opinion has been directed toward dis-
couraging the Defense Department's use of the incentive type contract. This
opinion is influenced by several factors, of which the most important is pro-
fits. Industries' profits on government contracts are closely scrutinized
by Congress or Congressional agencies, for excess profits mean waste of the
taxpayers' money and therefore a less than desirable reflection on Congress-
ional performance. Their desire for close control of profits is reflected
in three acts of legislation; the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 and the Renegotiation Act, last extended in 1962, under
which aircraft producers must refund all profits over 12% of the price of
their contracts during a taxable year. Apparent unfamiliarity with the pro-
fit earning arrangements of the incentive contracts, and therefore mistrust
in their use, causes the profit factor contribution to the unfavorable opin-
ion. A second factor contributing to this opinion is the lack of price
15

competition for incentive contracts that Congress prefers for all govern-
ment contracts. A third factor is general Congressional unfamiliarity with
the problems, limitations of application, and advantages to be gained through
the use of incentive contracts.
Early attempts by the Department of Defense and industry to make the
use of incentive contracts more attractive were made in 1959 when they recom-
mended to Congress that the Renegotiation Act be ammended to exempt incentive
earnings from incentive type contracts from the effects of the act. Congress-
ional objection was expressed by Rep. Carl Vinson (D-Ga.) when he claimed
12that industry's objective was the gain of excess profits. The law was ex-
tended without change to 1962.
The opinions of Congress and the shortcomings of their criticisms of
the incentive type contracts were most evident during the Special Subcommittee
hearings on procurement practices of the Department of Defense during April,
13
May and June of I960. The chairman of this committee, Rep. Vinson, lead
the opposition against the Navy's and Air Force's defense of the use of in-
centive contracts for aircraft procurement. The subcommittee's position was
based to a great extent on the inability of the Department of Defense to
prove compliance with 10 USC 2306(c) which states that no incentive contract
may be made unless it is first determined that (a) it will likely be less
costly than other type contracts, (b) that it is the only practicable way to
12
Katherine Johnsen, "DOD Opposes Bill To Tighten Incentive Contracting
Practices," Aviation Week and Space Technology
,
(June 6, 1960), p. 34.
13
U. S. Cong., House of Representative? Special Subcommittee on Procure-
ment Practices of the Department of Defense, Section 4 , Public Law 86-89, Hear-
ings before Subcommittee, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., April 25-29, May 2-5, 31,
June 1, 3, 9, 1960, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960).
16

secure the item, and these determinations must be made in writing by the
contracting officer.
Representatives Vinson and William H. Bates (Mass.) frequently stressed
the "likely to be less costly than other type contracts" aspect, but the
emphasis was almost totally off line since the determination of any aircraft
procurement contract costs are matters of human judgemeat and evaluatioa.
:
*F, "... •
Congress has the advantage of after the fact evaluation denied the contract-
ing officer during contract negotiations and even in the case of a fixed
price contract, the true costs (considering all implications) cannot be
evaluated until after operational employment of the aircraft. Since the
"likely to be less costly" and "most practicable" requirements of 10 USC
1306(c) are matters of judgment and not subject to after the fact compari-
son with alternative choices, a criticism of incentive contracts on these
grounds is not firmly based.
Rep. Vinson also critieed the incentive contracts on the grounds that
maximum competition wasn^t utilized in procurements under incentive contracts
but as mentioned before in this paper, the complexity of modern aircraft
r
precludes the use of competitive procurement and this is supported by the
allowances made for aircraft procurement in the A S P R. The complexity of
modern aircraft also provides the answer to Rep. Vinson's query as to why
commerical businesses don't use incentive contracts. In regard to the Navy's
use of the incentive contracts Rep. Vinson commented,
"and all you have been able to accomplish now, for 3 years (ending
December 31, 1959) is out of $2, 500 million worth of contracts
it has only been effective enough to save 67 million?"!^
It may have been only effective enough to save $67 million (2. 687c-costs







but that is $67 million that probably wouldn't have been saved through use
of an alternative type contract and doesn't take into account the value to
the Navy and the defense effort of exceeding the performance and scheduling
targets.
The Subcommittee's position was supported by the testimony of the Army.
Assistant Secretary of the Array for Logistics, the Honorable Courtney Johnson,
stated that the Army had never found a situation in which the incentive con-
1 £
tract would be advantageous to the government. The Army also stated that
incentive targets were too difficult to determine to warrant their use but
under questioning from Representative Bates it was shown that the Army also
had incentive payments for efficiency in some of their contract types as do
the incentive contracts. Representative Vinson seemed much impressed by
the Army's testimony but the Army's point was not very well taken in opposi-
tion to the Navy-Air Force position wince the Army is not involved in air-
craft procurement. Army aircraft are procured by the Air Force.
Another criticism of the incentive contracts was offered by Representa-
tive Vinson to General Davis of the Air Force Material Command when he stated
that contractors can back the services down on incentive contracts to accept
18
their terms or the services would have to do without the desired aircraft.
Such a situation is highly unlikely but if it did arise it would hold for
any type contract. The competitive features mentioned in Chapter I, should
preclude the occurrence of such a situation and enhance the government's posi-






. , p. 365.
18

There were several instances in these hearings that indicate a lack of
committee familiarization with incentive contracts that should preclude
their evaluation of the contracts' usefulness. Representative Bates indicated
that he thought overruns and underruns referred to the number of aircraft
19in production rather than costs. Representative Frank J. Becker of New
York stated that contractors could increase profits by 207. overall on an
20
80/20 sharing line rather than increasing profits by 20% of cost savings.
Representative William G. Bray of Indiana claimed he was leery of incentive
type contracts and compared them with paying a doctor an extra fee if he
21
saves your life. The relevance and quality of such an analogy are very
questionable. Representative Bray, with the concurrence of Representative
Vinson, stated that if you can't trust a man enough to do a job without an
22incentive he shouldn't be permitted to undertake the job. It takes little
thought to see the shallowness of such a statement offered in criticism of
the incentive type contract. Regardless of how assailable the foundations
qf such criticisms are, they are nevertheless a discouraging influence on
contracting agencies desiring to employ incentive contracts and an influence
that can, and must be changed to one of encouragement through effective, ef-
ficient contracting.
Not all Congressional opinion on the incentive contracts has been critical,
but due to the lack of legislative support for the incentive contracts its
proponents have been able to achieve, they must be considered to be in the
19
Ibid. , P. 309.
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minority. Congressional appreciation of the problems and advantages of in-
centive contracts was probably most clearly exemplified in 1959 when Sen.
Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass.) introduced a bill that proposed ammending the
U. S. Code to require the use of incentive or fixed price contracts whenever
possible and to exempt incentive contracts from Renegotiation Board proceed-
23
ings. It is believed that such legislation could result in appreciable
benefits to both government and industry but it has failed to gather suffi-
cient support for enactment.
The Government Accounting Office is another agency of the legislative
»
branch whose influence tends to act as a disincentive on the use of incen-
tive type contracts. Headed by the Comptroller General, the GAO is respon-
sible solely to Congress. With the influence of this Congressional respon-
sibility, industry tends to doubt its ability to retain incentive profits witfl
GAO auditing of contracts, and the advantages of the incentive contracts are
therefore greatly reduced.
Another government agency that tends to inhibit incentive contracting
is the Renegotiation Board [37]. The Renegotiation Board is an independent
government agency that annually reviews certain government-industry contracts
in order to determine the presence of, and reclaim excess profits for the
government. The Renegotiation Act of 1951, ammended in 1958, provides allow-
ances for the determination of excess profits in incentive type contracts.
Such factors as contractor efficiency, reasonableness of costs and profits,
risks assumed, type of product and contribution to the defense effort are
considered in assessing incentive profits but definitive standards required
for the equitable evaluation of excess profits under such variables are not
23
The Congressional Record, Volume 105, Part 1, 86th Cong., 1st Session,
January 1-29, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 880.
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available. Such arbitrariness in the retroactive removal of incentive
profits can greatly impair incentives. Another impairment to incentives is
the fact that in several instances the funds required by the Renegotiation
Board have approximately equaled the amount of profits earned under incen-
24
tive contracts. By disregarding the effects of incentive contract fea-
tures on profits the Renegotiation Board tends to allow profits at rigid per-
centages and in effect alters incentive contracts toward cost plus fixed fee
types with their associated disadvantages.
The extreme variance of views of incentive contracting held by the
various departments of the government concerned with aircraft procurement is
probably only exceeded by the aviation industry's variance. Requests for
views on incentive contracting made to several aircraft manufacturers have
resulted in referral to other sources or a "they're good if they can be made
to work" viewpoint. Correspondence from the Government Contract Management
Association of America, Inc., indicates that there is no industry wide norm
on incentive contract evaluation. G C M A has conducted numerous seminars,
discussion sessions and lectures on incentive contracting for many firms
within the aircraft industry. The questions and responses received from in-
dustry in these sessions have indicated feelings of from mild interest to
apathy and/or disgust for incentive contracts depending upon the particular
company and/or company representative. Objective evaluation is too easily
biased by the success or failure of past contract* and to whose credit the
success or failure must be made. Industry, however, does appreciate the
value and need of incentive contracts. This is exemplified by a statement
24
Weston, 0p_. , Cit . t p. 8.
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in the annual report of the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., for 1956
concerning the effect of renegotiation on incentive contracts:
The financial loss to the company is serious, but the removal
of all incentive for efficiency is far more alarming. The
incentive type contract devised to encourage efficient production,
provides increased earnings for keeping costs below the agreed
upon target. The Renegotiation Board has in 1953 demanded as ex-
cessive profit not only all such incentive payments but also a
part of the initial target profit thereby defeating the purpose
of the incentive contract.
A major goal of both government and industry must be to reduce these variant
views to one of appreciation and trust in the use of incentive contracts if





New Incentive contracting procedures and provisions, and fjoprov -> its
or further development of many current procedures and provisions must be
instituted by both the Navy and industry if incentive contracting is to
lead to the high degree of effectiveness in aircraft procurement that it is
capble of attaining. Recognition and appreciation of the contractual goals
and present problem areas of the Navy and industry by each other are essen-
tial if such developments are to be incorporated. However, since it is the
government's dollar being spent on government defense the burden of respon-
sibility for these developments must rest with the government. The follow-
ing paragraphs contain a discussion of the various procedures and provisions
of the incentive contract that provides the background for the recommenda-
tions in part IV.
The aircraft contractor's willingness to accept an incentive type con-
tract or particular incentive arrangements within an incentive contract de-
pends to a great extent on his business volume and financial status at the
time of contract negotiations. Such acceptance conditions obviously do not
consider the position of the government in a contract and for full advan-
tage to be gained from contractual incentives these conditions must be alter-
ed. The advantages to be gained from an incentive type contract go beyond
those mentioned previously of procuring the most effective aircraft possible
with given budget restraints. The contractor's conditions of acceptance can
be changed by awarding contracts only to firms that are willing to share an
equitable portion of the contract risks through incentive formulas. The same
23

formulas must also be used to discourage over-optimistic producers by pro-
viding for appreciable profit reductions where standards aren't met. Such
employment of incentives would tend to stabilize the aircraft industry base
by forcing out marginal companies. For those companies remaining in the in-
dustry, incentives would prevent satisfaction with the status quo since in-
creased profits would depend on increased contractor performance.
A step toward realizing these advantages is in the establishment of
realistic incentive limits. The minimum acceptable standards in the contracts
must provide for meeting the government's requirements while the standards for
maximum incentive profits must be attainable by the contractor and useable
by the government. Incentives must be used consistently so that contractors
can estimate profits commensurate with effort but incentive plans must not
be so standardized that they take on a fixed fee character. Targets and
share ratios can be varied or combined to benefit both industry and government
where standard plans don't fit particular situations. Incentive targets must
be carefully evaluated. If targets are too tight a disproportionate amount
of risk may fall on the contractor while if targets are too loose they may
act as a disincentive since most firms are not interested in trying to gain
excess profits or any particular procurement since it might jeopardize their
long range profit earnings. Finally, the applicability of an incentive con-
tract to a particular aircraft procurement, the incentive targets, and the
share formulas must be mutually decided upon. A consequence of failure to
mutually decide these factors was evidenced in the Air Force's BOMARC missle
program where the Air Force's failure to heed the advice of Boeing on the
use of an incentive type contract cost the Air Force $14 million extra in
final price.
Katherine Johnsen, "McClellen Airs Incentive Contract Issue," Aviation
Week and Space Technology , (May 28, 1962), p. 38.
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Present aircraft procurement procedures and policies necessitate a great
deal of reliance on initial use of the letter type contract but the time for
conversion to a definitive type contract must be reduced for the effective
utilization of incentives. The interim between letter and definitive con-
tract dates leaves the government solely responsible for all costs incurred
on the procurement and the later a definitive contract is negotiated the
harder it is to establish effective incentives.
Once an incentive contract has been adopted there are several procedures
to evaluate contract performance in addition to the most common method of
comparing final negotiated or audited costs to original targets, and final
aircraft performance capabilities and delivery dates to the original tar-
gets. One such alternative would be to evaluate contract performance periodi-
cally throughout the development and production of the aircraft. Such a
method would lead to increased administrative expense but the periodic deter-
mination of the project's profit status should act as an added incentive to
the middle management of the contracting firm. The farther down an organ-
ization the incentives can be applied the more effective they are likely to
be. To further aid in moving the incentive motivation to the lowest possible
levels in an organization, more liberal share formulas could be negotiated
with firms operating an employee profit sharing plan. Another available pro-
cedure is to make awards for performance in an after the fact manner. This
is presently being experimented with in the Cost Plus Award Fee type con-
tract in level of service situations where the award size is determined by
an evaluation board. This type of contract arrangement would reduce the
profit sharing negotiations and the administrative costs of present incen-
tive contract procedures but it would require a high degree of award consis-
tency to be effective. This procedure is not considered feasible for general
25

employment in aircraft procurement, however, due to the arbitrainess of
award and the absence of known incentives during the procurement process.
Design and performance specification changes ordered by the Navy are
a major detriment to the effective use of contractual incentives. Often
these changes must be made to keep abreast of changing technology but all
too frequently they are the result of inadequate planning. Many of these
changes necessitate reevaluation of incentive targets and/or sharing formulas
at the cost and inconvenience of both the contractor and the Navy. Since
the reevaluation of the targets and formulas are made on a sole source basis
the threat of increased costs is most acute for the Navy. More extensive pre-
production planning is the optimal way to reduce these changes but they could
also be minimized by making their incorporation more advantageous to the
contractor. Contractors' sharing formulas and target profits could be in-
creased in proportion to the extent of contractor effort needed to incorpor-
ate the change, automatically, without initiation of claims by the contract-
or [25]. The increased costs to the Navy through the altered incentive a-
ward possibilities compounded with the time costs and difficulties associat-
ed with making these alterations will often outweigh the advantages of the
change. Such changes would be best delayed and incorporated by the Navy.
Contractor recommended changes should be by the Navy where the
Navy's cost effectiveness will be increased but the Navy must not become so
involved with such changes that any unforseen profit reductions can be at-
tributed to their actions.
Another major stumbling block to effective incentive contracting is the
present award policy. The situation was well summed up in 1962 by Thomas D.
Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics when
he stated that incentive contracts do not provide a large enough incentive




fail to provide adequate penalties for poor performance. Too often fees
are set just high enough to interest industry but well below maximum allow-
27
able [25], and then lowered on follow on contracts. It may be argued that
profits in the aircraft industry are above those of other industries and
this claim is true if profits are figured on average return to net worth.
However, if profits are figured on sales volume they fall below the profit
levels of other industries. Perhaps a better criterion is to base profits
28
on the amount of assets required to produce the equipment sold. Regardless
of the profit measuring method employed, profit opportunities must be flex-
ible enough to provide the appropriate incentive for any particular con-
tract. With the opportunity for greater profits, firms would be inclined
to invest more of their finances and efforts in better products and to
assume greater degrees of contractual risk. Greater profit opportunities
would also remove some financial burden from the government since the air-
craft firms would be able to enhance their position with commerical finan-
cial institutions. With profits restricted it can be to the advantage of
the contractor to increase contract costs at the expense of limited profit
losses. In this age of space exploration, restricted profits on aircraft
procurements tend to make aircraft firms unwilling to accept aircraft con-
contracts in lieu of more lucrative space development contracts. Relaxing
the rigidity of present profit spreads (for example, FPI profits tend to
29
cluster close to 9.5% ) would also increase contractor performance incentive,
for greater differentiation would be made for performance variations. This
?6
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performance incentive could be further increased by basing profit ranges on
past contract performance. For greatest effectiveness this increased pro-
fit opportunity should be applied to areas of incentive profits coupled
with a reduction of target profits. The Navy's method of determining target
profits by use of the weighted guidelines method [25] could be continued but
with reduced weights so that greater reward attainment responsibility lies
with the contractor. The weighting for determination of target profits would
have to be applied inversely to the degree of certainty assigned target esti-
mates to ensure equitable profits as targets become more definitive. Reduced
target profits and greater reliance on incentives would threaten the profit
level of a firm for contract non-compliance or minimal effort. This would
prevent the firm from assuming the defensive position of just maintaining
their sales and profit levels on any particular aircraft contract. Another
counter balance to the increased profit opportunity would be to reduce the
incentive share formulas in proportion to the amount of contractor reliance
on government material, facilities and financing. Since profits are such a
small percentage of total contract price to the Navy, the availability of
greater profits should result in lower overall contract price and "costs."
Renegotiation Board proceedings have also limited the effects of in-
centive contracts. Threat of loss of earned profits to the Renegotiation
Board acts as a disincentive. Since the Renegotiation Board has no defini-
tive criteria with which to measure incentive profits, incentive effective-
ness would be increased by exempting incentive profits from Renegotiation
Board action except in cases where it is the substantiated opinion of Navy
contracting personnel that contractor profits are the result of chance
rather than contractor efficiency. Such cases would be submitted to the
Renegotiation Board for resolution.
28

With the increasing emphasis on the weapon system method of aircraft
procurement there is the possibility of increasing the efficiency of an air-
craft contract by providing profit incentives for weapon system management.
Under this arrangement profit incentives would be provided to prime con-
tractors holding weapon system management responsibility. The continuing
development of modern, complex aircraft has made subcontracting costs in
weapon system procurement an ever more important factor in total contract
price. The emphasis in subcontracting in aircraft procurement has been
shifting from the comparatively simple structure components to the intri-
cate and expensive electronic system components and test equipment. Closer
consideration and supervision of subcontract awards with increased possi-
bilities for cost savings could be realized through employment of such an
incentive.
Several methods are available for increasing the effectiveness of perform-
ance incentives in incentive type contracts. The determination of awards for
performance should be based on the maintainability of the aircraft as well as
the meeting of performance specifications. This could be accomplished by
basing awards on the evaluation of maintenance reports such as FUR's (Failure,
Unsatisfactory Report) and/or evaluation reports compiled by PAR (Progressive
Aircraft Rework) personnel over a predetermined time period. Such a system
might require augmenting the present maintenance report system and it might
not provide a timely production incentive but by forwarding copies of these
reports to the aircraft companies concerned it would provide justification
for awards and provide the aircraft companies with a background on trouble
areas for use in later production or new contracts.
Incentives should be applied to overall contract performance, as opposed
29

to product performance, in the development stages of aircraft procurement
since the cost contracts required in this stage place maximum risk on the
government. The desire for follow on production provides sufficient in-
centive to meet aircraft performance specifications, but greater overall
gains could be realized by the Navy by establishing profit incentives in
conjunction with a PERT (Performance Evaluation Review Technique) type
system [5].
Present schedule incentives appear to be adequate and will continue to
contribute to the effectiveness of incentive contracts as long as greatest
reliance is placed on positive incentives rather than reliance on default
or liquidated damages threats. However, due to the effect of these nega-
tive incentives, the schedule incentives should always be weighted subordin-
ate^ to the cost and performance incentives.
The successful use of an incentive contract is most dependent on the
establishment of realistic target costs and associated cost sharing formulas.
Basing profits on costs that are extremely difficult to determine and that
can continually fluctuate provides the basis for the majority of the critic-
ism against incentive type contracts. The inherent difficulties in cost
determination are often compounded by contractors setting costs at levels
they consider to be a "going" price with the government. These cost propos-
als often must be evaluated by government contract personnel who, because of
their many and varied job demands can't become familiar enough with the
contractor's operations to provide adequate assessment. A great deal of the
costing for today's technically advanced aircraft must be based on historical
costs and with the increasing complexity and value of the aircraft's elec-
tronic control, guidance and weapons components the previously used dollar
per airframe pound costing method is completely antiquated. Per unit costs
30

must be closely evaluated on any one aircraft procurement from contract to
contract involving quantity changes since low quantity costs won't neces-
sarily correspond with high quantity costs. In evaluating costs and prices
the Navy must also consider the eventual maintenance and operating costs of
the aircraft which can be even more difficult to determine than the original
cost. The cost problem is also compounded by the urgency of aircraft procure-
ments which is indicated by the extensive use of letter contracts. Accurate
cost estimating is a time consuming effort. If, alternatively, the letter
contracts are necessitated by the Navy's lack of firm aircraft plans and
specifications then the proposed costs are inflated by the contractors justi-
fied proposal expenses. In the face of all these difficulties in establish-
ing realistic cost targets, cost incentives must be established over a range
large enough to keep the incentives in effect over the entire contract period.
For maximum effectiveness, a cost limit should be established which must be
met before other incentives are effective.
Once mutually acceptable cost targets and sharing formulas have been
negotiated they often are ineffective due to the contractor's disutility for
cost reductions as compared with the incentive advantages on a particular
contract. The contractor may use increased costs to improve his facilities,
cover overhead on other projects, or improve his product in order to secure
a higher long run profit level than can be gained through comparable profit
gaining efforts on a particular contract. It is the responsibility of the
Navy to ensure that the profit advantages significantly outweigh the contract-
ors* advantages of increasing costs.
The reliance on and extension of historical cost data cannot be avoided
but the inaccuracies of the resulting cost targets can be compensated for in
several ways. A level share line or plateau can be established around the
target cost with the range of the plateau depending directly on the degree
31

of inaccuracy associated with the target. This provides some degree of pro-
tection against cost uncertainties to both the government and industry but
as the range of the plateau extends, the opportunity for the contractor to
pad costs with no reduction in profits becomes greater. An alternative
method for coping with uncertain cost targets would be to review similar
previous contracts, determine the mean of their cost underruns and lower
the target cost in question by this mean value. This target could be used
or targets could be arranged in efficiency classes with the contractor given
the option of using either the base target cost or the target cost establish-
30
ed by reducing the base cost by the mean underrun value. The base cost
target would have more restricted profit opportunities since the altered
target would be considerably tighter.
In the CPIF contract a cost share line should be established beyond the
negotiated maximum overrun figure to prevent disregard of costs beyond this
point. This share line should be shallower than the portion within the ef-
fective cost range due to the original cost uncertainties necessitating the
CPIF contract and established in proportion to the assumed amount of un-
certainty.
To insure that the contractor's utility for cost increases doesn't ex-
ceed that for profit increases, the slope of the share line should be in-
creased as cost savings are increased in order to stimulate the contractor
to greater cost saving efforts. The Navy should also require that the con-
tractors provide the cost data for auditing or for «*gotiating profits based
on direct costing rather than absorption costing. This would force the con-
tractor to separate direct and variable costs and preclude the application







Regardless of the methods employed in the utilization of incentive con-
tracts, extreme care must be taken to insure that government controls over
contractor operations are kept to a minimum. This caution coupled with the
provision of industry with the Navy's long-range aircraft procurement plans
to aid industry's planning will help insure the proper government -industry





1. Where the use of letter contracts is necessitated, reduce the time
currently being taken for conversion to a definitive contract.
ASPR requires conversion of letter type contracts to a definitive type
for all military procurement within 180 days. This limit does not provide
for the long lead time requirements in most aircraft procurements. For
more realistic aircraft procurement requirements this limit should be ex-
tended to a 9 month to 1 year limit depending upon the type aircraft being
procured. Strict adherence to this restriction should result in reduced
conversion time for as can be seen in Exhibit I, the majority of the air-
craft contracts in the sample required in excess of one and occasionally
two years for conversion. The pressure on the government and the contractor
to meet the 180 day limit doesn't permit proper determination and evaluation
of costs and therefore tends to place disproportionate emphasis on develop-
ment and scheduling requirements with the resultant delay in contract con-
version. A more realistic conversion time combined with restrictions in the
profit incentive arrangements in follow on contracts for late provision of
cost information by the contractor should result in an overall reduction in
conversion time during which the government assumes sole cost responsibility.
2. Provide more liberal incentive share formulas for firms operating
employee profit sharing plans than the formulas negotiated with firms with-
out such plans.
This recommendation would make appreciable profits available at the
lower organization levels where the greatest potential for cost reductions
34

and production efficiency exists. Contractual incentives would therefore be
more optimally applied.
3. Hold all non-essential aircraft changes until scheduled PAR periods
31
and perform necessary changes in block arrangements.
The use of PAR periods for aircraft changes would eliminate the diffi-
culties and expenses of refiguring incentive arrangements for changes, reduce
contract costs, and eliminate an obstacle to most efficient production. By
incorporating changes in a block system, retooling costs, production delays
and incentive changes are kept to a minimum. These steps would not only re-
duce costs but the elimination of the various inconveniences would make in-
centives more meaningful and improve government-contractor relations.
32
4. Increase the incentive profit ranges and reduce target profits.
The profit spread and target profit size would have to be based on the
certainty of incentive estimates but the recommended changes over present
procedures would place more emphasis on efficient contractor performance for
appreciable profits. Contractors would not be assured of a satisfactory
profit for minimum performance and greater profit differentiation would be
made available for performance variances.
5. Exempt incentive profits from Renegotiation Board proceedings ex-
cept where it is determined by Navy contracting personnel that such profits
are the result of chance.
This recommendation would remove the disincentive effect of the Re-
negotiation Board while at the same time providing a degree of protection
against windfall profits. With the threat of loss or reduction of earned
31Booz-Allen-Hamilton, 0f>. Cit . , p. 236.




incentive profits removed from the contractor, contractual incentives would
better provide the stimulus for which they're designed.
6. Provide incentive profit arrangements for weapons system management.
The increased subcontracting costs of modern aircraft procurement places
a great deal of responsibility on the weapon system manager. If incentives
are properly applied for this management, sizeable cost savings can be realiz-
ed by the government. Due to the various weapon system management arrange-
ments that can be established, the mechanics of applying incentives to these
arrangements is an area recommended for further study.
7. Base the greatest weighting for performance awards on fleet evalua-
te
tion reports.
An aircraft may be able to meet pre acceptance test requirements but
the true test of the aircraft's performance should be the way it meets fleet
operational requirements. Maintainability under operational conditions
should be the major performance criterion, for regardless of the aircraft's
performance characteristics, if it can't be maintained in an "up" status
its value to the Navy is negligible.
8. Key PERT to profits. 33
Profits awarded for meeting various checkpoints in a PERT system would
not only provide incentive for timely development and production but would
eliminate the employment of manufacturing shortcuts or ineffective techni-
ques to meet schedule incentives.
34
9. Establish cost efficiency classes.
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Cost efficiency classes would base obtainable profits on the certain-
ty of established cost targets and adjusted cost targets. With the degree
of profit opportunity directly related to the target certainty the govern-
ment would be protected against windfall profits and the profits awarded would
be a truer indication of the contractor's efficiency.
10. Employ shallow share lines for cost overruns in CPIF contracts.
Since the use of CPIF contracts is necessitated by uncertain cost tar-
gets, extension of the cost share line would protect the government against
a contractor's disregard of costs once the negotiated cost floor for profits
had been reached.
35
11. Require the use of direct costing methods.
The use of direct, vice-absorption costing methods would insure that
the government would only pay those costs associated with any particular
contract. Direct costing is quite commonly employed in industry so it Bhould
provide no burden on the contractor for use on government contracts.
12. Place greater reliance on the use of CPIF contracts in the develop-
ment stages of aircraft procurement shifting to the FPI contract in the pro-
duction stages.
This contractual arrangement provides the proper combinations of in-
centives for the various procurement stages, if properly employed, to insure
that the Navy receives the most effective aircraft for the dollars spent and
to insure the contractor of an equitable profit.
35
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Sample FPI Multiple Incentive Contract Arrangement.
For example purposes it is assumed that the degree of confidence in
establishing incentive targets warrants use of the FPI contract and all shar-
ing formulas are simple straight line relationships.
target costs -$100 million
confidence in target cost + 20% ($20 Million)
target profit $10 million (107.)





ceiling price - $120 million
The following weights are assigned to the incentive factors:
cost - 50% (+ $2 million*)
performance - 25% (+ $1 million*)
schedule - 25% (+ $1 million*)
*based on 14% profit determined reasonable for meeting maximum incentive
goals and 6% profit for meeting minimum incentive goals.
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Sample CPIF Multiple Incentive Contract Arrangement.
For example purposes it is assumed that the degree of confidence in
establishing incentive targets warrants use of the CPIF contract and all
sharing formulas are simple straight line relationships.
target cost $100 million
confidence in target cost + 25% ($25 million)
target delivery date 24 months after date of contract award
performance incentive speed
target - 500kte
maximum useable - 550kts
minimum acceptable - 450kts
target fee -- $5 million
maximum fee -- $9 million
minimum fee -.- $1 million
The following weights are assigned to the incentive factors:
cost - 50% (+ $2 million-)
performance - 25% (+ $1 million*)
schedule -- 257. (+ $1 million*)
*Computed in terms of target fee
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